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The question whether the various norms of the acquis communautaire may be
applied to disputes between private parties was at the heart of many sport rulings
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (further referred to as “CJEU” or
“the Court”). The Bosman ruling, the most renowned ruling of the CJEU relevant
to FIFA, dealt with the freedom of movement of workers guaranteed by the Treaty.
Now, the CJEU in its Bauer ruling confirmed that the fundamental rights enshrined
in the Charter might under certain circumstances become horizontally applicable.
This post argues that this development of judgments has implications also for sport
federations, among them the Féderation International de Football Association (FIFA).
First came Bosman…
The influence of actions undertaken by the Union’s bodies for the sport sector
and the individuals practicing sport activity, both for leisure and for money, in
the European Union goes beyond the merely supportive, coordinative, and
supplementary catalogue of competences, as can be derived from Art. 6 (e) and
Art. 165 para 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The Court ambitiously raised the level of protection of the rights of the athletes in
the European Union via its judicial activity. This process, strung across the decades
from Walrave and Koch until the recent case of TopFit and Biffi, ran parallel to a
general progress in ensuring the effectiveness of the rights of individuals in the EU.
FIFA has been particularly affected by the renowned Bosman case, which led to
a substantial reform of the FIFA transfer system in order to conform to the right to
freedom of movement of Union citizens playing football professionally1)See J.J.
Binder, M. Findlay, The Effects of the Bosman Ruling on National and Club Teams in
Europe, Journal of Sports Economics 13(2), July 2008, p. 107-129.. The subsequent
developments involved the cases Simutenkov and Bernard in which the Court
further specified FIFA’s subjection to the Treaty provisions guaranteeing freedom of
movement of workers in the European Union.
Until now, the sporting jurisprudence of the Court may be framed as a progressive
expansion of the horizontal applicability of the primary law of the EU. The Court
relied in Walrave and Koch on the concept of horizontal applicability of the Treaty
provisions prohibiting  discrimination on the grounds of nationality  to justify the
application of then community law in the dispute between athletes and the Union
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Cycliste Internationale. Afterwards, the Court further developed the concept of
horizontal applicability of the Treaty provisions, this time in the context of Single
Market freedoms, in Bosman.
The horizontal applicability of EU law remains particularly relevant for FIFA, because
the practice of sporting activities, and in particular football, in the European Union
is often subjected to a private regulatory regime. National associations, clubs,
and athletes are bound by the rules issued by international sport federations.
International sport federations, although often forceful and rich, are not states but
private associations. Therefore, the relation between athletes and federations is
usually of a horizontal nature, although the balance of power is strongly tilted in favor
of the governing bodies. This imbalance triggered the Court’s jurisprudence on the
horizontal application of EU law. Arguably, along the 25 years that passed since the
Bosman ruling, FIFA, UEFA, and other sport governing bodies operating in Europe
have learned that their actions must remain in conformity with general principles of
Union law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality or impeding the
freedom of movement of EU athletes.
…then Bauer
The most recent jurisprudence of the Court – in cases Egenberger (a case of alleged
discrimination on grounds of religion included in the job offer issued by the Evangelic
Church in Germany) and Bauer (a case in which the successor of the employee
sought for the payment of allowance in lieu for paid annual leave against the private
employer) – although not directly referring to athletes – might strengthen FIFA’s
awareness of yet another significant part of EU law – the horizontal applicability of
the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(Charter). In Egenberger, the Court stated that Art. 21 para 1 of the Charter (i.e.
the prohibition of discrimination) “is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right
which they may rely on as such in disputes between them in a field covered by EU
law” (in para 76). The Court also noted that the national court has to award “the
judicial protection for individuals flowing from Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter” by
guaranteeing its full effectiveness through disapplying the contrary provisions of
a national law if needed (see para 78-79). However, the court has an obligation
to balance competing fundamental rights of both parties to the dispute, so the
fundamental rights of one individual are limited by the fundamental rights that may
be derived from the Charter by other individuals (see para 80-81).
These remarks were further developed in the Bauer ruling. The Court examined
the horizontal applicability of the provisions of Art. 31 para 2. of the Charter on
the right to paid annual leave and came to the conclusion that this provision is of
a mandatory and unconditional character. Consequently,  it is sufficient to confer
on workers a right “that they may actually rely on in disputes between them and
their employer in a field covered by EU law and therefore falling within the scope
of the Charter” (see para 80-85). In such a situation, first, the national court should
consider national legislation contrary to the fundamental right as inapplicable and,
second, the employer cannot rely on that national legislation (para 86). The Court
declared that simply because the Charter is in principle addressed to the Member
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States and the institutions of the European Union (as provided by the literal wording
of the Art. 51 para 1 of the Charter), it did not systematically preclude the application
of the provisions of the Charter to relations between private parties. Additionally,
private parties might be directly required to comply with certain provisions of the
Charter (para 87-89). These conclusions were further reaffirmed in the Max Planck,
Sindicatul and Cresco rulings. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the horizontal
applicability has been extended by the Court to the fundamental rights enshrined in
the Charter.2)However, see the judgment, Federación de Servicios de Comisiones
Obreras (CCOO) v Deutsche Bank SAE, where the Court reverted to indicating
Member State’s obligation to ensure the full effectiveness of the Charter in the
dispute among private parties.
But, is Bauer the new Bosman?
There are various characteristics integral to the European model of sport and
the principles governing sporting activity in the European Union that can give
rise to sporting disputes warranting the horizontal applicability of fundamental
rights. Firstly, the structure of sports governance in Europe, based on the above-
mentioned imbalance of power and the monopolistic position of sport federations in
the European pyramid of sport, is prone to encouraging the invoking of fundamental
rights against private sporting regulations. The uneven relation becomes even
more imbalanced in circumstances in which one party is in a position to one-sidedly
regulate the rights and freedoms of many actors. The 21st century Leviathan is often
a beast of a private nature, and FIFA embodies this development.3)See S. Walkila,
Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in EU Law, p. 231-234; E. Frantziou, The
Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the
Reasons for Horizontality ps. 668-677.
The observance of fundamental rights that protect basic rights and freedoms of
individuals, which are inseparably attached to them as human beings and result from
human dignity, should be uniform across different legal orders, as should be the level
of protection granted by them. Therefore, as stated by Walkila and Frantziou, the
reason for a uniform protection of fundamental rights, irrespective of the nature of the
relation between the parties, is to protect the “integrity, priority and effectiveness” of
European Union law and contributes to the fulfillment of the telos of the European
Union, i.e. building an ever closer Union.4)See S. Walkila, Horizontal Effect… (op.
cit.), p. 261-272; E. Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect… (op. cit.), p. 665-666.
The demand for such a uniform protection of fundamental rights in the European
Union is the effect of changes to the character of European integration, as well
as social and economic realities, throughout the last 60 years. The European
Community, which around the time of the Walrave and Koch ruling was hardly
integrated economically, has become a constitutionalized Union of common
values, freedoms and fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.5)E. Spaventa,
Should we “harmonize” fundamental rights in the EU? Some reflections about
minimum standards and fundamental rights protection in the EU composite
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constitutional system, “Common Market Law Review” 55, 2018, p. 997-1024; on
the constitutionalization of the EU, see A. Rosas, L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law,
An Introduction, Hart Publishing, 2018; L. Pech, The Rule of Law as Constitutional
Principle of the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/09. This should
also be reflected in the approach of the European Union to different dimensions of
the activity of its citizens – i.e. the protection of fundamental rights in the EU should
permeate all spheres of Union law. In the context of sport, what once was “subject to
community law only to the extent of constituting economic activity”, is now “subject
to all the obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty” when
sporting activity falls within the scope of the Treaty. In Bauer, the Court reminded
that “the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are
applicable in all situations governed by EU law” (in para 52).
Moreover, just one year ago FIFA itself in Art. 3 of its statutes committed to respect
human rights and strive to promote the protection of these rights. Therefore I believe
that the values of the European Union determined in Art. 2 of Treaty on European
Union, as well as the catalogue of fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are
not contravening with values sported by FIFA, as well as with the fundamental goals
of modern Olympism. In other words – FIFA and the EU play to the same goal, or at
least not opposing ones.
What may vary, however, are the methods by which both organizations strive
to reach the declared objectives. The way advanced by the CJEU in Bauer is in
principio addressed to national courts, which should, in their jurisdiction, ensure
proper enforcement of the Charter if a particular dispute falls under the scope of
EU law – mainly by disapplying the contrary national provisions and giving full
effectiveness to the respective provisions of the Charter. Consequently, in theory
football players will be able to invoke their fundamental rights enshrined in the
Charter against FIFA when they are able to prove that its actions fall under the scope
of EU law.
In light of the jurisprudence discussed above, the Charter could for example become
relevant for employment cases in football challenging FIFA regulations. Indeed, FIFA
regulations may, for example, be challenged not only on the basis of the Directive
2003/88 (which is hardly possible under the actual jurisprudence of the Court) but
also (and far more effectively) by invoking Art. 31 para 2 of the Charter. Another
example that could lead to a successful case against FIFA rules would be the
uneven remuneration for women and men national teams winning the FIFA World
Cup – such a practice could be declared contrary to Art. 21 of the Charter. However,
due to its extreme novelty, it remains very difficult to assess the potential impact the
Bauer line of cases could have on FIFA (and more broadly sports private regulators),
time and disputes will tell whether it will be a transformative one. Therefore, for the
time being, Bauer is not (yet) the next Bosman.
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